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Part) I:) A) legal) comparison) of) unilateral) conduct) rules) for) non0dominant) firms) ) Scope&of&the&enquiry&
! This! section! outlines! the! rules! on! superior! bargaining! positions,! or! its! flipside,! economic! dependency,! in! Japan,! Germany! and! the! United! States.! As! so! often! in! comparative! law,! the! national! terminology! and! definitions! differ! between! jurisdictions.!Accordingly,!one!has!to!take!care!not!to!use!the!idiosyncratic!legal! terminology! and! definition! of! superior! bargaining! positions! used! in! any! particular! jurisdiction.! Otherwise,! there! would! be! a! risk! of! missing! functional! equivalents!in!other!jurisdictions,!which!may!have!rules!to!similar!effect,!but!do! not!refer!to!these!rules!as!rules!on!superior!bargaining!positions.!! Instead,! the! working! definition! used! for! the! purpose! of! the! comparison! has! to! start! from! the! 'real! world! issue'! that! is! at! the! centre! of! the! research! question.! The! 'real! world! issue'! that! is! raised! by! the! various! rules! on! superior! bargaining!or!economic!dependency!provisions!is!the!following.!All!jurisdictions! reviewed!here!accept!that!firms!are!subject!to!constraints!when!they!enter!into! (horizontal)! agreements! with! their! competitors;! there! is! also! agreement! that! firms!may!under!certain!conditions!have!to!take!care!that!they!do!not!enter!into! vertical!agreements!with!their!suppliers!or!distributors!that!restrict!competition.! Moreover,!there!is!a!consensus!that!a!firm!in!a!dominant'position,!that!is,!a!firm! with!a!sufficient!degree!of!market!power!is!subject!to!certain!constraints!even!as! far! as! its! unilateral! conduct! is! concerned.! The! general! rule! is,! however,! that! unilateral' conduct' by' non4dominant' firms! is! unproblematic! from! a! competition! policy!perspective.!! The!reason!for!the!general!rule!is!that!vigorous!competition!is!more!likely! to!result!when!firms!know!that!they!are!acting!in!a!safe!harbour!provided!only! (1)!they!do!not!enter!into!restrictive!(horizontal!or!vertical)!agreements,!and!(2)! they!are!not!in!a!dominant!position.!Within!this!safe!harbour!for!non,dominant! firms,! firms! are! completely! free! as! to! their! choice! of! parameters! for! unilateral! conduct,!such!as!choosing!or!rejecting!trading!partners,!negotiating!for!different! conditions!with!each!of!the!trading!partners,!setting!their!own!prices!as!high!or! low!as!they!wish,!and!so!on.!! The!'real!life!issue'!in!this!legal!comparison,!then,!is!to!examine!rules!that! depart! from! this! general! rule! of! a! safe! harbour! for! unilateral! conduct! of! non, dominant!firms.! !Accordingly,!for!the!purposes!of!the!comparison,!this!paper!will!consider! 'rules! on! unilateral! conduct! of! non,dominant! firms'! to! comprise! all! rules! on! unilateral!conduct!that!apply!to!firms!that!do!not!(necessarily)!have!a!dominant! position! in! the! relevant! market.! This! may! mean! that! the! rules! require! some! heightened!degree!of!(bargaining)!power,!or!that!they!do!not!require!any'degree! of!market!or!bargaining!power.!For!the!purpose!of!this!enquiry,!I!exclude!rules! on!unilateral!conduct!that!are!meant!to!prevent!collusion!between!competitors! in! its! incipiency,! such! as! prohibitions! of! invitations! to! collude! or! calls! for! a! collective!boycott;!even!though!technically!they!are!rules!on!unilateral!conduct,! they!ultimately!seek!to!prevent!horizontal!agreements.! The! scope! of! the! forms! of! unilateral! conduct! to! be! examined! is! more! difficult! to! define! in! the! abstract.! On! the! one! hand,! there! are! certain! forms! of! prohibitions! on! unilateral! conduct! that! have! no,! or! very! little,! relation! to! competition! policy! concerns.! For! example,! non,dominant! firms! are! prohibited! from! unilaterally! selling! poisonous! food,! and! few! would! take! issue! with! taking! such!conduct!out!of!the!'safe!harbour'. 6 !In!contrast,!prohibitions!related!to!'unfair! trade! practices'! are! often! very! closely! related! to! competition! policy! concerns,! because! unilateral! conduct! by! non,dominant! firms! is! prohibited! precisely! because! of! its! effects! on! competitive! relationships.! I! have! described! the! conceptual! problems! in! defining! the! scope! of! problematic! prohibitions! on! unilateral!conduct!elsewhere.!For!the!purposes!of!this!contribution,!I!will!employ! a! common,core! approach! and! focus! on! four! hypothetical! case! scenarios! that! exemplify!many!of!the!issues!typically!addressed!by!rules!on!superior!bargaining! positions!and!other!rules!on!unilateral!conduct!by!non,dominant!firms. 
While the example may look like an argumentum ad absurdum, there is still a connection to competition policy concerns. For example, where the definition of 'poisonous' food is set sufficiently arbitrarily, it may be used to exclude competitors from entering a market (genetically modified food?). Paragraph 13 of the General Designation provides that it is an unfair trade practice to 'caus[e] a corporation which is one's transacting party to follow one's instruction in advance, or to get one's approval, regarding the appointment of officers of the said corporation [...] , unjustly in light of the normal business practices by making use of one's dominant bargaining position over the party.' 18 AMA Article 2(9)(ii) (price discrimination) and General Designation paragraphs 3 and 4 (discrimination in other cases than those covered by Article 2(9)(ii) AMA).
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AMA Article 2(9)(iii) (continuous supply of goods or services far below the cost incurred to supply them) and General Designation paragraph 6 (unjustly low price sales in other cases than those covered by Article 2(9)(iii) AMA).
20
General Designation paragraph 2 (refusal to deal).
21
See also, eg, General Designation 10 (tying) and 11 (exclusive dealing). (2) no 1 [scil: the prohibition of abuses by a dominant undertaking, in particular by directly or indirectly unfairly impeding another undertaking or directly or indirectly treating another undertaking differently without objective justification] also applies to undertakings and associations of undertakings to the extent that small and medium undertakings, as suppliers of or customers for a particular kind of goods or services, are dependent on the undertakings or associations in such a way that sufficient and reasonable opportunities to switch to other undertakings are unavailable to the small and medium undertakings (relative market power). The dependence on a customer, in the meaning of the first sentence, of a supplier of a particular kind of goods or services is presumed where this customer is regularly granted particularly advantageous conditions over and above the usual discounts on the price or other forms of consideration which are not granted to equivalent customers. (2) § 19(1) in combination with § 19(2) no 5 [scil.: the prohibition of abuses by a dominant undertaking, in particular by using its position to request from other undertakings advantages without objective justification, or to cause other undertakings to grant such advantages] also applies to undertakings and associations of undertakings in the relationship to undertakings that are dependent on them.' Note that, first, the presumption in the second sentence of subsection 1 only applies to the dependence of a customer on a supplier (and not vice versa), and, second, that in subsection 1 the dependent undertaking has to be an SME, while in subsection 2 the dependent undertaking may also be a large undertaking.
'tapping'!provision!primarily!in!the!distortive!effects!that!the!granting!of!special! conditions! had! on! the! horizontal! relationship! between! the! undertaking! with! relative!market!power!and!its!competitors;!others!extend!the!protective!purpose! to!the!vertical!relationship!between!the!dependent!supplier!and!the!undertaking! with!relative!market!power. 25 The paradigm example for this case category is the Rossignol case: The ski manufacturer Rossignol terminated a business relationship with a sports shop. The sports shop claimed that customers expected any decent retailer to stock Rossignol skis. Rossignol had a market share of only about 8%, and the Court found there to be 'considerable competition' between suppliers. Nevertheless, the court decided the sports shop depended on stocking Rossignol skis because of the customers' expectations, raised by Rossignol's advertising 'which can give branded goods a specific market position with the result that the customer feels unable to substitute the goods with other goods', and that Rossignol had a duty to deal with the sports shop. Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), 20 November 1975 , KZR 1/75, (1976 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 801, 802 (an English translation of an extract of the decision is available at <http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=1488>). In interpreting this case, one should bear in mind that Rossignol's stated reason for refusing to deal with the sports shop in question was that (2) where!dependence!is!'scarcity!induced '; 29 !and! (3) where! the! dependence! is! owed! to! the! 'unique! relationship'! between! the! supplier! and! the! distributor,! in! particular! where! the!parties!have!made!transaction,specific!investments.! ! However,!this!list!of!case!categories!is!not!exhaustive.!In!particular!with!regard! to! relative! market! power! on! the! demand,side,! in! particular! the! relationship! between!powerful!retail!chains!and!their!suppliers,!none!of!the!categories!above! are! directly! pertinent,! and! the! Bundeskartellamt,! following! proposals! in! the! literature,! has! proposed! to! add! a! further! category! of! 'demand,side! dependence'. 30 
the shop was selling Rossignol skis too cheaply. This case therefore directly involved the mischief which the legislator had sought to avoid by introducing the prohibition, namely the circumvention of the prohibition of resale price maintenance by unilaterally cutting off undertakings that undercut the recommended resale prices. See above xxx.
29
The paradigm example, which was already mentioned in the report accompanying the introduction of the provision on relative market power (Bundestagsdrucksache 7/765 at 10), was the supply of independent petrol stations during the oil crisis. Because independent petrol stations in an oil crisis have no sufficient outside options, vertically integrated petroleum companies were said to have a duty to apportion the available supplies in a non-discriminatory manner between its own branded petrol stations and independent petrol stations. Again, this was not always the case. Before 2007, the predecessor provision of today's § 20(2) ARC was limited to the protection of dependent SME suppliers. In 2007, the SME-requirement was struck out on a temporary basis; a sunset provision in the 2007 Act led to the reinstatement of the SME-requirement on 1 January 2013, before the 8th Amendment struck out the SME requirement on a permanent basis (contrary to the initial Bill for the 8th Amendment). offers other goods or services more than occasionally below the purchase price, or 3.
demands a higher price for goods or services from small and medium undertakings with which it competes on a downstream market for the distribution of these goods or services than the prices it offers itself on the downstream market, unless there is an objective justification. Offering food products below the purchase price is objectively justified where it helps to sell them sufficiently quickly to prevent the goods from perishing or becoming unsalable, or in similarly serious cases. (4) Where specific facts give rise to an inference that an undertaking has abused its position in the meaning of subsection 3, it is for that undertaking to refute the inference and to disclose circumstances in its sphere whose pleading is impossible for the competitor in question [...] but easily and reasonably possible for the undertaking.
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